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August 9, 2012 - 11:48am

By Sara Hayes, Senior Manager and Researcher, Policy and Utilities


ACEEE recently published a report ranking the energy efficiency of the world’s 12 largest economies. Unfortunately, the U.S. isn’t even in the running for a top spot. With a long history of energy efficiency advocacy and a supportive administration in the White House, I frankly thought the news would be better. Though there have been a few high points (for example, appliance standards and new vehicle fuel economy standards), the overall story is not good. The U.S. came in 9th overall. Yes, out of 12. 

While the U.S. results aren’t great, the “glass half full” here is that the U.S. has a lot of room for improvement. This would mean making the economy lean, mean, and more globally competitive—the Gabby Douglas of economies, the Michael Phelps of global competitiveness. Reducing energy waste is good for business and consumers. Reducing energy costs is good for the economy and reducing the air pollution associated with power generation is good for those of us who breathe air. Now is the time for the U.S. to dig in and improve its prospects by taking a lesson from some of the successes of other countries. The United Kingdom has adopted a national energy savings target of over 1% per year through 2016. Russia is requiring auditing and labeling of energy use in buildings. The Italian government supports a revolving loan fund for energy efficiency and provides incentives for improvements in the efficiency of motor vehicles. Germany offers incentives for deployment of combined heat and power systems and China targets heavy energy users in the industrial sector with specific energy conservation procedures.

Congress is considering legislation that will improve energy efficiency in a number of ways and Senator Kerry is slated to introduce a bill that includes a national energy savings standard.* Federal tax reform is another opportunity to realign financial incentives by allowing people to keep more of their income and instead taxing energy waste. In addition to congressional activity, federal agencies have taken action to encourage energy efficiency.  Significant opportunities exist and the untapped energy efficiency potential is massive. It remains to be seen whether the U.S. will cross the finish line as a leader or if these opportunities turn out to be just another false start.  

* This statement was made in error. We regret the mistake. 


International, National Policy

August 7, 2012 - 11:18am

By Steven Nadel, Executive Director


As the energy efficiency of products, homes, and businesses improves, it becomes less expensive to operate them. The rebound effect postulates that people increase their use of products and facilities as a result of this reduction in operating costs, thereby reducing the energy savings achieved. Periodically, some analysts raise questions about the rebound effect, arguing that it is a major factor that needs to be accounted for when analyzing energy efficiency programs. The most recent example is a report by the Institute for Energy Research, an organization that primarily works on oil, gas, coal, and electricity markets. In order to address these recurring arguments, today ACEEE released a white paper entitled The Rebound Effect: Large or Small? The paper is written in a “question and answer” format designed to summarize what we know, what we do not, and—given what we know—how large the rebound effect is likely to be. The paper examines both direct and indirect rebound effects.

Direct rebound is the impact of a purchase of an efficient product by purchasers’ use of that product. For example, a car buyer may drive an efficient car more often than an inefficient one or a homeowner who weatherizes his/her house may use a portion of the savings to increase the temperature in the house in the winter to increase comfort.

Indirect rebound, on the other hand, reflects the impact of re-spending the money that consumers and businesses save from improved energy efficiency. It can also include the fact that as factories and other parts of the economy get more efficient, production costs may be lower, freeing up funds to expand the factory and increasing demand for products. An example of the former is a household that cuts its heating bill and takes back a little of the savings on higher thermostat settings, but then spends the remaining money saved on eating out or buying a new flat screen television. An example of the latter is that efficiency improvements in aluminum smelting can reduce the price of aluminum, thereby fostering increased aluminum sales that requires additional energy consumption in its production.

There have been more than 100 studies published that attempt to estimate rebound effects, many of which we examined for our paper. We found that while there is some uncertainty, available evidence indicates that direct rebound effects will generally be 10% or less. Estimates of higher direct rebound effects are primarily based on studies of consumer responses to changes in energy prices, but as shown by Greene for vehicles, this is different from consumer response to changes in energy efficiency. There is a need for a study on home weatherization that attempts to separate out price and rebound effects to see if they are similar or different. Rebound is probably higher for weatherization of low-income homes since prior to weatherization some of these households could not afford to keep their homes as warm as they would have liked. And rebound may be higher during shoulder periods where use of heating or cooling is optional.

We found that there are larger uncertainties about the size of indirect rebound effects and more careful studies are needed. From the evidence that is available, the most likely estimate is that indirect rebound effects are on the order of 11%, increasing both energy use and the level of economic activity. This 11% estimate comes from a study by Barker and Foxon that used a sophisticated macroeconomic model to examine the impact of a number of United Kingdom energy efficiency policies over the 2000-2010 period. The study estimated that indirect rebound was 11% by 2010, with higher effects (15%) in energy-intensive industries and lower effects for commerce (5%), road transport (6%), and households (10%). Unfortunately, there are no similar studies of the U.S., although such a study would be useful.

Other studies, using different methodologies, come up with different answers, both higher and lower. At the high end, a variety of Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models have been used. However, such models are based upon a number of standard assumptions from neo-classical economics (perfect competition, constant returns to scale in production, consumers always work to maximize their utility) that are poorly supported by empirical evidence. In particular, the possibility of ”win-win” policies, such as those aimed at encouraging energy efficiency, cannot be fairly modeled if an economy is assumed to be at an optimal equilibrium, a key assumption of these models.

In conclusion, we found that there are both direct and indirect rebound effects, but these tend to be modest. Direct rebound effects are generally 10% or less. Indirect rebound effects are less well understood but the best available estimate is somewhere around 11%. These two types of rebound can be combined to estimate total rebound of about 20%. We examined claims of “backfire” (100% rebound), but they do not stand up to scrutiny. Furthermore, direct rebound effects can potentially be reduced through improved approaches to inform consumers about their energy use in ways that might influence their behavior. And indirect rebound effects, which appear to be linked to the share of our economy that goes to energy, may decline as the energy intensity of our economy decreases.

Overall, even if total rebound is about 20%, then 80% of the savings from energy efficiency programs and policies register in terms of reduced energy use, which benefits the environment and public health. And the 20% rebound contributes to increased consumer amenities (like more comfortable homes), as well as to a larger economy and more jobs. Therefore, these savings are not “lost,” but put to other generally beneficial uses.


Behavior & Human Dimensions, Economic Analysis & Jobs, Energy Efficiency Programs, Market Transformation, National Policy, State Policy, Residential, Transportation

August 2, 2012 - 1:09pm

By Steven Nadel, Executive Director


NOTE: This blog article revises and updates a previous entry.

“Is There an Energy Efficiency Gap?” is the title of a recent article by Hunt Allcott and Michael Greenstone published in the Journal of Economic Perspectives.  ACEEE wrote a critique of this paper.  In response, Allcott and Greenstone have posted an updated version of their paper.   Allcott and Greenstone examine energy efficiency and specifically “whether there are investment inefficiencies that a policy would correct.” They conclude that “the available evidence from empirical analyses of weatherization, demand-side management programs, automobile and appliance markets, the ‘landlord–tenant’ agency problem, and information elicitation suggests that while investment inefficiencies do appear in various settings, the actual magnitude of the Energy Efficiency Gap is small relative to the assessments from engineering analyses.”

The new version of Allcott and Greenstone’s work corrects a number of problems with their earlier paper.  In the new version they generally note all of an author’s findings and not just selected findings.  They also include some additional citations to relevant works.  Still, while acknowledging uncertainties, they have not changed their conclusion that the available evidence suggests that the energy efficiency gap is small.  ACEEE has just released a revised white paper examining their arguments. We find that the authors have some useful insights, but that rather than providing a dispassionate review of the evidence, they interpret available data in ways that best support their points, downplaying other research findings.

In much of the research they cite, they emphasize results using high discount rates, relegating lower discount rate scenarios from the same articles to footnotes. Likewise, they tell only part of the story when they say that landlords paying for investments and tenants paying for energy  do not cause a big barrier to efficiency investments, citing a study that insulation levels in multifamily rental homes in California are only slightly lower than single-family homes. They downplay the fact that California has a building code that requires all new homes to have high levels of insulation.

In the case of vehicle fuel efficiency, Allcott and Greenstone assert that existing and proposed CAFÉ standards appear to be overly stringent without reference to recent, dramatic advances in gasoline vehicle technologies. Nor do they mention that the standards now vary with vehicle size, which is relevant to concerns about consumer choice and potential loss of utility. They also ignore investment inefficiencies on the manufacturer end, though these help to explain why fuel economy standards are so useful.

More broadly, it is also worth noting that externalities and information gaps are not the only rationales for energy efficiency policies.  Efficiency policies can spur manufacturers to develop higher efficiency products, giving consumers more choices and creating economies of scale help to reduce the price of these efficiency improvements.  Past standards have helped spur the development of new motor vehicles, lamps, and clothes washers.  Furthermore, utilities offer efficiency programs because they are less expensive than new power plants. 

Allcott and Greenstone do have some useful points to make. They argue that consumers are heterogeneous and that policies should be tailored to address this. For example, they argue that appliance standards for heating and cooling equipment should be different in Chicago than in Los Angeles. We tend to agree—for example, we successfully advocated that the latest standards for furnaces and central air conditioners vary between the North and South. However, customizing policies also has costs, and a balance needs to be found between ease and cost of implementation and addressing heterogeneity.

Finally, Allcott and Greenstone argue that additional rigorous empirical work is needed—utilizing randomized controlled trials and quasi-experimental techniques. In fact, Allcott and Greenstone (together and separately) now have two such projects underway. We agree that further study would be useful. Randomized controlled trials can be very useful, but these can be hard to do in the “real world” as they can be expensive and hard to fit in around other programs that are serving the same customers.  Thus, while we support randomized control trials where possible, we believe that they can and should be complemented with careful evaluations of consumer responses to existing programs relative to a control group of non-participants.    Analyses can also be conducted on important sub-groups of participants in large programs.  There are hundreds of current programs that could be evaluated, providing useful information to design the most effective energy efficiency programs.

Therese Langer contributed to this blog post.


Energy Efficiency as a Resource, Energy Efficiency Programs, Market Transformation, Residential

July 20, 2012 - 11:14am

By Andrew deLaski, Executive Director, Appliance Standards Awareness Project (ASAP)


A new report published last week by the anti-regulatory Mercatus Center (an advocacy outfit associated with the Koch brothers) took aim at appliance and vehicle efficiency standards. In the report, the authors argue that standards reduce consumer choice and are not justified because the environmental benefits are small and consumer benefits are non-existent.

Nothing could be further from the truth. Efficiency standards have a long record as a commonsense way to save money for consumers and provide important societal benefits at the same time. The Mercatus report, entitled Overriding Consumer Preferences with Energy Regulations, is by two economists, Ted Gayer and Kip Viscusi. It’s so full of false claims, inaccurate assumptions, and misleading statements that it’s hard to know where to start refuting them. But I thought it would be useful to rebut some of their most egregious claims. 

False claim #1: “[C]urrent energy efficiency initiatives do very little to address climate change”

Taking into account all U.S. appliance standards starting with the original round signed into law by Ronald Reagan and including those updated by the Department of Energy (DOE) under two Republican and two Democratic administrations and those added by both Republican- and Democratic-controlled Congresses, U.S. standards reduced greenhouse gas emissions by about 200 million metric tons in 2010, and annual reductions will increase to about 450 million metric tons by 2025. That works out to about 3.5% of actual U.S. 2010 emissions and 8% of projected 2025 emissions. (See Figure 4 in the ACEEE report, The Efficiency Boom.) Vehicle fuel economy and greenhouse gas standards for model years 2012-2016 are projected to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 307 million metric tons in 2030, lowering car and light truck emissions by 21%. Standards now under consideration for model years 2017-2025 would deliver similar reductions. Undoubtedly, more can and should be done to address climate change, but to suggest that standards “do very little” is absurd.

False claim #2:  Efficiency standards restrict consumer choice

Refrigerators are the most regulated appliance in America, having been subject to no fewer than six rounds of improved state and federal efficiency requirements over more than 30 years.  Think about it for a moment. Do you have fewer choices in refrigerators than you did 10 years ago? For those who can remember, than 30 years ago? How about for clothes washers? Or for light bulbs? 

For each of these products, consumer choices have increased even as standards have eliminated energy-inefficient models from the market. Refrigerators come with a wider array of configurations (the latest rage is French doors—GE just added a second shift at its Louisville, Kentucky plant to keep up with demand), ice and water dispenser options, built-in designs, and other features than have ever existed. Clothes washer buyers have an array of energy- and water-efficient front-loading and top-loading designs covering price points from $400 and up to choose from, many with features like steam cleaning unheard of a decade ago. For light bulbs, manufacturers report that the standards spurred them to introduce a whole new generation of energy-efficient incandescent bulbs so that consumers can now choose among energy-efficient incandescent, compact fluorescent, and newly-introduced LED options. Consumers have more choice than ever.

False claim #3:  Consumer savings are non-existent

The crux of the authors’ argument is that consumers and businesses maximize their own welfare in their everyday decision making, so, by definition, any government action that results in different decisions cannot make them better off. However, DOE has identified and assessed a variety of widely-recognized market and behavioral realities that explain why efficiency standards yield benefits for consumers. One such reality is that efficiency-related cost savings is only one of many features that define a product, and that optimizing across multiple attributes is complex, time-consuming, and costly for consumers. Another reality is that there are often transaction costs that get in the way of recovering investments in more efficient products, as in the case of split incentives among landlords and tenants, and for homeowners who are considering selling their property within a product's lifetime. Energy cost savings for an individual consumer would often not justify the time and cost to gather and assess information, and when appropriate, to compensate for the transaction costs. It is by no means irrational for consumers to apply ”bounded rationality” in making decisions, a concept that explains reasonable consumer behavior in complex environments. 

Oddly, Gayer also mentions that various “market failures” could result in underinvestment in energy efficiency (i.e., the “energy efficiency gap”): 

...an energy efficiency gap could be due to market failures entirely consistent with a presumption of consumer rationality. For example, if renters have incomplete information about the energy efficiency of their apartment building, then a landlord might underinvest in energy efficiency because he is unable to recoup the cost in rental rates. There may be other market failures that can contribute to suboptimal consumer choices, such as lack of information about future costs of more- versus less-efficient products, or inefficiencies stemming from average cost pricing for electricity due to natural monopoly. Such market failures present economic justification for possible government regulation….” (emphasis added). (See page 4 of the Mercatus Center report.)

Gayer himself has validated DOE’s explanation for why certain market failures result in a “suboptimal” investment in energy efficiency.

In a report published earlier this year, we found that the net present value benefits of consumer benefits from all standards completed to date now tops $1.1 trillion dollars (see the executive summary of The Efficiency Boom).  Those are very impressive savings, but still represent only a fraction of a percent of total consumer and business spending, so it is not at all surprising that consumers often don’t undertake efforts (which can be complex, time-consuming, and costly) to assess the economically optimum efficiency level.

Finally, we’ve probably underestimated consumer benefits from existing standards, perhaps by quite a lot. Estimates of the cost to improve efficiency are based on the best information available at the time each standard was completed or enacted, converted to present value. In practice, those estimates have tended to be higher than the actual prices seen in the market. Learning by manufacturers, scale economies, and technological innovation all drive down the costs to improve efficiency. One need look no further than the refrigerator example—a typical new fridge uses one-third as much energy as one from the 1970s and is larger and more fully featured, yet costs only one-third as much. In other words, the historical record suggests that standards have had little to no impact on the price of refrigerators. 

False claim #4: Government officials act with "single mission myopia" and "perhaps the main failure of rationality is that of the regulators themselves” 

The authors’ overheated rhetoric reveals their work as an attack job designed to undercut the role of government in addressing society’s problems and to demonize the individuals doing the work. An ad hominem attack against the highly competent, hardworking professionals at federal agencies should have no place in developing smart energy policy that delivers secure, economic and environmentally-sound results for our country. 

In contrast with the claim, DOE has long conducted standards-setting processes that are open and transparent, and provide a great forum where consumers, utilities, manufacturers, and other interested parties are welcomed by DOE and regularly raise new data and perspectives. If anything, this transparency has increased in recent years. The fuel economy regulatory processes have been similarly transparent.

Further, there is a well-used process for review, both within the government, and, when an aggrieved party feels it necessary, through the courts. Notably, the court reviews have found neither a plague of myopia nor of poor rationality at DOE. 

False claim #5: Pollution reductions are the only societal benefits of energy standards

Gayer admits that the environmental benefits to society from reduced greenhouse gas and other polluting emissions are worth considering. But he stops there and does not consider any other societal gains. However, saving electricity, oil, and natural gas provides other important benefits. For example, when a consumer purchases an efficient product, the extra cost works out to about one cent per kilowatt-hour saved for an efficient light bulb and about 4 cents per kilowatt-hour for an efficient appliance. If the efficient products were not purchased, more power would be needed from new power plants that cost on the order of 6-14 cents per kilowatt-hour (see Lazard Ltd.'s 2011 report, Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis - Version 5.0), a cost that is shared among all consumers and not just consumers who purchase inefficient products. Put more simply, we’d all be paying a lot more for electricity today if not for existing efficiency standards.  Moreover, siting those power plants and the associated transmission lines can impose additional costs on those who live nearby. Producing, importing, and transporting coal, oil, and natural gas has costs and consequences beyond those reflected in the price of the commodities.

False claim #6:  “The Department of Energy issued standards for metal halide lamp fixtures and walk-in coolers in 2012”

Now I’m nit-picking, but DOE has not yet issued either one of these standards, which seems like a pretty simple fact to get right. But this claim strikes a nerve because Congress required DOE to issue standards for these two product categories by January 1, 2012. DOE missed that deadline and has yet to issue even a proposed rule for either product. Both proposals appear stuck in the review process at the Office of Management and Budget: walk-in coolers have been there since last September and metal halide lamp fixtures since February. 

While I’m nit-picking, Gayer also cites a 2000 poll performed for Mercatus that found that “…by a margin of 6 to 1 the public opposed regulations that would effectively eliminate top-loading washing machines (page 32).” This is not terribly interesting since the clothes washer standards Mercatus criticized didn’t ban top-loaders (the standards took effect in 2004 and about half of the clothes washers sold today are top-loaders). DOE just completed a new update to the clothes washer standards, and once again, the standards do not ban top-loaders. I suppose that won’t stop knee-jerk critics like Gayer from citing the 2000 poll.

Many thanks to Steven Nadel and Therese Langer of ACEEE and Robin Roy and Ben Longstreth of Natural Resources Defense Council for their contributions to this blog entry. 


Appliance Standards