

The Context and Organization of Demand-Side Management Collaboratives: An Overview

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Since 1988, a new approach to reaching agreement on Demand-Side Management (DSM) program design and policies has been tried by many utilities and nonutility parties (such as consumer advocates, environmental groups, and state energy offices) across the country. This new approach, called a DSM collaborative process, attempts to reach consensus among oftentimes adversarial parties rather than using traditional litigation alone to resolve differences. This paper describes key contextual and organizational characteristics of collaboratives, using data collected during a recent study of nine cases of DSM collaboration involving 24 utilities and approximately 50 nonutility parties (NUPs) in 10 states. A lengthier report (Raab and Schweitzer 1992) presents the full breadth of findings from that study, including a detailed analysis of the successes and failures of the collaboratives.

Based on a review of the relevant literatures on Integrated Resource Planning and dispute resolution and on the authors' experience, four categories of contextual and organizational variables were chosen for study: (1) the regulatory and legal history of the collaborative; (2) the parties involved and those excluded; (3) the scope of the collaborative; and (4) the collaborative process. Regulatory and legal history includes the factors leading to initiation of the collaborative and the historic ability of different participating parties to influence the decisions made by state Public Utility Commissions (PUCs). Key characteristics of the parties involved and excluded include the types of participants, their expectations and willingness to compromise, and the attributes of those who did not participate. Under the topic of scope, the focus was on overall collaborative goals and on key issues tackled by the collaborative. Finally, the variables selected in the process arena include organizational structure, the use of outside consultants, and the use of consensus.

Introduction

In 1988, in the aftermath of a contentious rate case, the Connecticut Department of Public Utility Control (DPUC) ordered Connecticut Light and Power Company (CL&P) to work jointly with the intervenors to enhance its DSM efforts (Ellis 1989; Cohen and Townsley 1990). Since then, a wave of DSM collaboratives has swept the country (Boston Edison Company et al. 1990; Cohen and Chaisson 1990; members of California Collaborative 1990; Raab 1989; Raab 1991). Table 1 shows the collaboratives that we studied and the state(s) in which they operated. The size of the collaboratives ranged from just two parties in the New England Electric System (NEES) — Conservation Law Foundation of New England (CLF) Collaborative to as many as 10 in Phase I of the Massachusetts Collaborative, 15 in the California Collaborative, and 28 in the Wisconsin Collaborative. While the collaboratives shown here do not constitute all the DSM collaboratives underway at the time this study was begun, they constitute the majority and include those with the longest track records.

Research Methods

Descriptive materials were collected for each of the nine cases; these included both primary (e.g., PUC orders) and secondary (e.g., journal articles) sources. After these written materials (e.g., CL&P May 1988; Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities August 1988; PUC of Ohio 1989; Vermont Public Service Board 1989-91; Wall and Giffin 1990) were reviewed, collaborative participants were interviewed. In three of the cases — California, Massachusetts, and NEES-CLF — face-to-face interviews were conducted, with telephone follow-up as necessary. In the other six cases — Central Vermont Public Service Corporation (CV), Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (CG&E), CL&P, Potomac Electric Power Company (PEPCo), New York State Electric and Gas Corporation (NYSEG), and Wisconsin — telephone interviews alone were employed. Eighty-seven interviews were conducted in total. No interviews were conducted after the fall of 1991, so this study generally does not encompass collaborative activities that occurred after that time. In all

Table 1. DSM Collaboratives Studied

Case Study	State
California (four utilities)	CA
Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company (CG&E)	OH
Connecticut Light and Power Company (CL&P)	CT
Central Vermont Public Service Corporation (CV)	VT
Massachusetts ^(a) (six utilities)	MA
New England Electric System (NEES) — Conservation Law Foundation of New England (CLF)	MA, NH, RI
New York State Electric and Gas Corporation (NYSEG)	NY
Potomac Electric Power Company (PEPCo)	MD
Wisconsin (eight utilities)	WI

(a) In the Massachusetts Collaborative, all but one utility had separate collaboratives with NUPs after completion of the joint phase.

cases, the same general interview protocol was used, although questions were tailored to fit the expertise of the respondent and to follow up on points made earlier in the interview or in previous interviews with other participants. In most cases, one or more representatives from each of the participating groups were interviewed. Only when two groups represented similar interests or the number of participating organizations was high were any participating groups excluded; in such cases, we interviewed representatives from the most active organizations involved.

Findings

The context in which a collaborative operates and the way in which it is organized are potentially important determinants of what is accomplished and how satisfied the participants are with the process and outcomes. Four major characteristics of the case study collaboratives are discussed in detail below.

Regulatory and Legal History

Initiation of Collaborative. Table 2 shows that the CL&P Collaborative, which began in February 1988, was the oldest of those we studied; the Wisconsin Collaborative, formed in October 1990, was the newest. Six of the nine cases were initiated following extensive intervention by NUPs on the topic of DSM. In many of these cases, litigation had been on-going for a number of years. In four of the nine cases, the agreement to collaborate was part of a settlement between the utility and NUPs on a current issue of contention. However, this does not mean that pressure from intervenor groups, by itself, is sufficient to lead utilities to participate in DSM collaboratives. The ability of such pressure to result in a utility decision to collaborate will be determined in large measure by the utility's own strategic needs. For instance, one condition of the settlement that resulted in formation of the PEPCo Collaborative was that intervenor groups would not oppose the utility's plan to build four combustion turbines at Chalk Point. In this case and others, utilities were allowed to satisfy various high priority corporate objectives in return for their participation in a

Table 2. Key Items of Collaborative History

Case Study Site	Date Collaborative Began	Date Collaborative Ended	Did Collaborative Follow Extensive History of DSM Intervention?	Was Collaborative Part of Settlement in a Formal Case Between Utility and NUPs?	Was Collaborative Ordered by PUC?	Had PUC Aggressively Promoted DSM Prior to Collaborative?
California	Aug. 1989	Phase I: Jan. 1990 Phase II: April 1990	Yes	No	No ^(a)	Yes
CG&E	Sept. 1989	On-going	No	Yes	No	No
CL&P	Feb. 1988	On-going	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
CV	Jan. 1989	June 1991	No	No	No	Yes
Massachusetts	Aug. 1988	Phase I: Dec. 1988 Phase II: On-going for 2 utilities ^(a)	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
NEES-CLF	Aug. 1988	On-going	Yes	Yes	No	MA-Yes RI-Yes NH-No
NYSEG	April 1990	March 1991	No	No	No ^(b)	Yes
PEPCo	May 1990	On-going	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Wisconsin	Oct. 1990	On-going	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

(a) Boston Edison Company and Western Massachusetts Electric Company Collaboratives are on-going. Fitchburg Gas and Electric Company never entered Phase II. Cambridge Electric Company and Commonwealth Electric Company, Eastern Edison Company, and Nantucket Collaboratives all were over by early 1991.

(b) Collaboration was strongly encouraged by state regulators but no order was issued.

collaborative. Utility agreement to collaborate on DSM programs also can reflect the utility's own appraisal of the benefit of increased DSM investment in light of its overall capacity situation. In other words, while litigation can press the issue, whether or not a utility enters into a collaborative is strongly influenced by the utility's strategic needs and objectives at that particular historical juncture.

In several cases the formation of DSM collaboratives was preceded by a NUPs' study of utility DSM efforts that described the potential for additional DSM programs. The results were then disseminated to interested parties in both the regulatory and utility communities. Such an approach was followed by the New England Energy Policy Council, whose "Power to Spare" report (Cohen and Chaisson 1987) was published in July 1987 and was used a few months later by some of its member organizations to intervene in a CL&P rate case. The expertise shown by these organizations probably was a factor in the Connecticut DPUC's decision that CL&P should cooperate with these groups in the expansion of the utility's DSM programs.

In two cases (CL&P and Wisconsin), utility participation in the collaborative was ordered by the PUC. In two other

instances (California and NYSEG), formation of a collaborative was strongly encouraged by PUC members but not formally ordered. Finally, the Massachusetts Commission was considering a request to order a collaborative when the utilities volunteered. These historic facts suggest that PUC action (or the prospect of such action) can lead utilities to participate in a collaborative arrangement whereby nonutility interests can gain increased and more continuous representation in all phases of DSM planning and implementation.

In most of the cases studied, the birth of the collaborative was signaled by the development of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or similar document that presented the overall goals of the collaborative and its general structure. We believe that formalizing group goals, processes, and responsibilities early, and making sure that the stated arrangements are acceptable to all parties, is critically important. In the CG&E Collaborative, for example, it appears that some of the NUPs expected more decision-making authority than was actually specified in the MOU, which might have led to subsequent dissatisfaction.

Influence of Key Parties. As described in the preceding section, PUCs sometimes require or encourage utilities to participate in collaboratives with key NUPs. However, PUCs also can exert substantial influence without directly addressing the issue of collaboratives. Where a PUC has historically been aggressive in promoting DSM, utilities can be influenced to participate in a collaborative in an effort to improve relations with regulators. Also, in such a situation, utilities can be fairly certain that they will be expected to aggressively pursue DSM in the future, so that participation in a collaborative is not likely to lead to an extensive (or expensive) departure from the direction that the utility would probably have to take anyway.

The influence of various NUPs is determined by how likely they are to get the PUC to side with them instead of with the utility. Where a utility can be fairly sure that NUPs will not be able to effectively intervene to block the utility's desired course of action, much of the incentive to participate in a collaborative evaporates. If a utility does participate in a collaborative under such circumstances, it is unlikely to depart significantly from its intended course of action, since it would expect PUC resolution of contested issues to be decided in the utility's favor. Where utilities and NUPs each consider the influence of their traditional adversaries to be roughly the same as their own, the incentive to seek mutually agreeable solutions through the collaborative (as opposed to seeking one's own ideal solution through litigation) is likely to be greatest. However, even where their ability to influence PUC decisions is substantial, NUPs still could be willing to collaborate with utilities in order to achieve greater control over the final details of the resulting plan.

Parties Involved and Parties Excluded

Number and Types of Participants. In addition to utilities, five different types of NUPs were represented in the collaboratives studied: consumer/public advocates (often representing the interests of residential, and especially low-income, customers); environmental/conservation advocates; large industrial electricity users; state regulatory advocacy staff; and state energy offices. The first three of the nonutility categories listed above can include both government and nongovernment organizations. In some cases, the same group represented more than one set of interests (e.g., environmental and consumer interests) although often one of these interests comprised the primary focus of the group in question. Also, state regulatory advisory staff often acted as observers, facilitators, or nonsignatory parties to the collaborative.

Utilities participated in all nine cases, followed closely by environmental/energy advocates (eight cases) and consumer advocates (seven cases). State energy offices and regulatory staff were represented in five cases and large electricity users had direct representation in four cases. In many cases there were multiple groups representing the same general interest (e.g., multiple utilities in California, Massachusetts and Wisconsin). The number of different interests represented in a single collaborative varied substantially from case to case.

Behavioral and Attitudinal Characteristics. Expectations concerning the operations of the collaborative and what it should accomplish can affect the collaborative process and participant response. For example, a major difference in expectations was reported in the CV Collaborative, where the utility appeared to see the collaborative as a substitute for litigation, while CLF saw it as a complement to litigation, narrowing the scope of contested issues but not necessarily eliminating the need for subsequent adversarial proceedings. In such a case, the party that expected the collaborative to signal a new, more cooperative relationship among parties can feel betrayed when one of the other participants intervenes against them. Another important difference in expectations can involve the range of issues that will be resolved by the collaborative.

The willingness of the various parties to retreat from their initial (and often unrealistic) positions and find mutually acceptable solutions was cited by many participants as an important determinant of collaborative outcomes. This willingness to negotiate might be influenced to some extent by the individual characteristics of the participants and, to a greater extent, by the mission of the organization they represent. However, it is probable that the most powerful factor influencing an organization's willingness to negotiate is its power and influence relative to the other parties and its perception of what it could gain through the collaborative compared to what it could accomplish by sticking to its position and seeking a litigated solution.

The commitment of time, attention, and resources by participating organizations can be an important determinant of how well, or even whether, a collaborative continues to function. In the case of the CL&P Collaborative, the process slowed to a near standstill after its first successful development of a DSM plan due to the shifting of the utility's attention to other pressing business and the difficulty of several NUPs in mustering sufficient resources to devote to the collaborative due to competing demands from other projects for limited staff time and agency funds. Not only can insufficient resources or attention potentially undermine the collaborative as a

whole, but it also may diminish the influence of whichever groups reduce their level of participation.

Excluded Parties. Although the collaboratives generally included a variety of organizations, most of these efforts did not invite (or could not succeed in gaining) direct representation by every conceivable group with an interest in DSM issues. In many cases, the participating organizations were those that had been involved in past litigation leading to formation of the collaborative. Limiting the number of participating parties in a collaborative can have both positive and negative results. On the positive side, the number of viewpoints to be reconciled is kept low, increasing the likelihood that a mutually acceptable solution can be reached. On the negative side, those groups that are not directly represented do not have the opportunity to participate in the process, raising the possibility that the collaborative plan will not optimally serve all societal interests and increasing the likelihood of subsequent outside intervention.

Scope of Collaboratives

Overall Goals. Each collaborative had its own goals, which represented the common intent of the collaborative group. Most often, the jointly-held collaborative goal was to design and implement a comprehensive package of cost-effective DSM programs and resolve relevant policy issues. Shared goals generally were developed at the time of the collaborative's inception and formalized in a MOU or other document that established the collaborative.

Key Issues. The types of issues addressed by the collaboratives studied were basically the same from case to case. In all instances but one, both program design and policy issues were addressed. Typically, monitoring and evaluation strategies were addressed as well.

Program design included the establishment of cost and savings data for various DSM options, the combination of related options into programs, the development of customer incentives, and other tasks. The policy issues that were addressed included methods for determining cost-effectiveness (including approaches to calculating long-run avoided costs and factoring in environmental externalities), rate-making treatment (program cost recovery, lost revenue recovery, and positive financial incentives), prioritization of potential DSM programs, fuel switching, and other issues. In many cases, the resolution of these policy issues proved more difficult than reaching consensus on program design questions (Table 3). While most collaboratives tackled issues related to cost effectiveness and rate-making, nearly all shied away from dealing with fuel switching. Where fuel switching was the subject of

negotiations (CV and Wisconsin), it proved difficult to resolve.

Collaborative participants expressed different opinions on whether or not policy issues should be resolved early in the collaborative process. Many respondents said that early resolution was desirable, because policy decisions can have considerable effect on program design. On the opposite side of the issue, several respondents maintained that early attempts to solve difficult (and often divisive) issues like fuel switching and cost recovery can result in the establishment of bad feelings among participants and can make it more difficult to reach subsequent consensus in areas of potential agreement. In some cases, early resolution of all policy issues is not possible, because new issues can arise out of the analyses undertaken during the collaborative.

The Collaborative Process

Organizational Structure. The decision-making structure of the collaboratives was similar from case to case. All the collaboratives had multiple organizational levels (Table 4), with each level having distinct responsibilities. The most common arrangement was a three level structure. On top was a committee, with names like "Steering Committee" or "Oversight Committee," that was made up of representatives from upper management of the participating organizations and had the authority to resolve disputes and provide policy guidance. In many of the collaboratives, this committee met rarely or not at all. Overall direction of collaborative activity usually was provided by the middle organizational level, most typically referred to as the Working Group, which generally contained representatives from all major parties to the collaborative. The third level generally consisted of Program Design Teams staffed by technical experts, which performed the detailed tasks necessary for program implementation and evaluation.

Where a two-level structure was used, many of the responsibilities described above for the top two organizational levels typically were assigned to a single powerful Working Group or Panel, with detailed policy and program design issues handled by committees or subcommittees. In the single case where a four-tier system was used (NEES-CLF), the responsibilities of the two lowest levels were much the same as for the two lowest levels in a three level arrangement, but two upper tiers [consisting of pairings of NEES's Vice President (VP) and CLF's Senior Attorney on one level and NEES's Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and CLF's Executive Director on the uppermost level] were used successfully to provide high-level policy guidance and dispute resolution.

Table 3. Spectrum of Issues Addressed by DSM Collaboratives

Least Difficult:

1. Identifying potential DSM technologies and inefficient end uses
2. Designing research and development efforts
3. Packaging measures into programs and designing marketing and delivery strategies
4. Screening measures and programs for cost-effectiveness (using previously adopted cost-effectiveness tests)
5. Designing evaluation and monitoring plans
6. Choosing customer incentives for programs
7. Detailing cost-effectiveness tests for measure and program screening (including method for determining long-run avoided cost)
8. Selecting annual budgets for individual DSM programs and overall DSM effort
9. Ratemaking and cost-recovery issues (also in ascending order):
 - A. Allocating DSM expenditures to rate classes
 - B. Expensing vs. amortizing DSM expenditures
 - C. Recouping lost revenue caused by DSM savings
 - D. Other utility incentives (i.e., shared-savings, bounty)
10. Environmental externalities
11. Fuel switching

Most difficult:^(a)

- (a) Other issues that were fairly controversial but not widely discussed among the collaboratives included the role of DSM bidding/performance contracting and the role of load building programs.

Use Of Coalitions. Where more than two parties were involved (all cases except for NEES-CLF), the formation of coalitions represented a way to reduce the number of divergent opinions expressed on key issues and to magnify the influence of individual groups. In the CV, CL&P, and Massachusetts Collaboratives (all of which included CLF), a coalition was formed involving all the NUPs and this remained relatively stable over time and for most important issues. In these cases, the collaboratives had the characteristic of a two-party negotiation on many issues. In the remaining cases, coalitions shifted over time depending on the nature of the issue and the interests of the participants.

The use of stable coalitions to simulate a two-party negotiation has the advantage of focusing discussion and narrowing choices. However, this approach also has several drawbacks, including the need for internal negotiations within the coalition which can add to the time required for plan development, the possibility that coalition members will become polarized in opposition to the utility, and the potential for a narrowing of the range

of options and the representation of minority opinions that a true multiparty negotiation makes possible.

Outside Consultants. Two key features of nearly all the collaboratives studied was the use of consultants by the NUPs and the funding of these consultants by the utilities (Table 4). It could be argued that collaboratives as we know them would not be possible without such funding for NUP consultants, since NUPs often do not command sufficient resources to hire their own experts and generally do not possess the expertise necessary to engage utilities in meaningful technical discussion on program design issues.

In almost all cases, the outside consultants were selected by, and reported to, one or all of the NUPs, but the selection of NUP consultants often was subject to a veto by the utility. Outside experts also could report to all parties (including the utility) and, in fact, this was done throughout the CG&E Collaborative and during the first two-and-a-half years of the CL&P Collaborative. In total,

Table 4. Major Features of the Collaborative Process

Case Study Site	Organizational Levels--from Top Down	Funding of Consultants	Selection of Consultants	Control of Consultants
California	Working group Subcommittees	by utility ^(a)	---	---
CG&E	Management group (met once) Working group	by utility	by working group	by working group
CL&P	Policy committee Working group Program design teams	by utility	by NUPs (with utility veto)	by all parties; then NUPs alone
CV	Steering committee (never met) Working group Program design/resource allocation teams	by utility	by NUPs (with utility veto)	by NUPs
Massachusetts	Oversight committee (met once) Working group Program design/policy teams	by utility	by NUPs (with utility veto)	by NUPs
NEES-CLF	CEO/Executive director VP/Sr. attorney DSM manager/NUPs' coordinator Program design/policy teams	by utility	by CLF (with utility veto)	by CLF
NYSEG	Collaborative committee Working group Program design staff	by utility	by CLF	by CLF
PEPCo	Steering committee (never met) Policy & resource allocation team Program design teams	by utility	by Office of People's Counsel (OPC)	by OPC
Wisconsin	Demonstration panel Committees	by utility ^(b)	Not applicable	Not applicable

(a) The California Collaborative made very limited use of consultants, and this was primarily for help with document preparation for the entire group.

(b) The Wisconsin Collaborative did not use consultants per se but did pay nonutility panel members for attending meetings.

nearly \$6 million has been spent to date for outside experts in the cases we studied.

Generally, a joint fact-finding effort was conducted early in the collaborative, during which the NUPs' consultants helped establish technical facts to the satisfaction of all participants. This phase was valuable because it provided a nonthreatening way for the different parties to interact, create a positive group dynamic, and become familiar with everyone's interests without any issues being explicitly negotiated.

Use of Consensus. In nearly all the collaboratives, DSM plans and related policies were developed by consensus. The one exception was the CG&E case, where the NUPs provided input but detailed program design decisions were made by the utility alone. Consensual plan development (used everywhere else) means that all parties must agree

in order for plans and policies to be submitted to the state PUC as a consensus filing. Nothing prohibited a utility or a subset of collaborative participants from submitting a plan or a portion of a plan to which there was not universal agreement, but this submittal would not be considered a consensus filing. The use of a consensual model does not assure that consensus will be reached on all issues, but the absence of such a model means that the NUPs will have less power in the collaborative process and less influence on utility decision making. Accordingly, consensual plan development seems essential to the spirit of collaboration. The consensual process can be enhanced by holding consensus training sessions for participants early in the life of the collaborative, as was done in Wisconsin.

Facilitation and Mediation. Third party neutrals from outside the pool of collaborative participants were used as facilitators or mediators only in the CL&P case, and this arrangement was not adopted until after two and a half years of operation without third-party assistance. In all other cases, the functions of facilitation and mediation were provided by the participants themselves. Facilitation functions include the scheduling of meetings, exchange of information, delineation of issues, and establishment of internal deadlines and responsibilities. Mediation differs from facilitation in that mediators actively assist parties in reaching consensus, often working individually with parties outside the larger group meetings. Accordingly, mediation is potentially very useful but also is generally more difficult to perform and more controversial than facilitation.

Elapsed Time. As shown in Table 2, there has been substantial variation in the length of time covered by the collaboratives studied. The California Collaborative and the Massachusetts Phase I Collaborative, at less than half a year each, were the shortest lived. The longest-lived collaborative is the one begun at CL&P over three and a half years ago, which continues to this date. In more than half of the cases, collaborative activities are still continuing as of this writing. While the continuing communications among parties allowed by collaborative longevity can be positive, shorter collaboratives also can lead to important products and agreements.

Use of Time Constraints. Many respondents mentioned the use of time constraints as an important tool for keeping the collaborative process moving along without excessive delays. These constraints can take the form of deadlines for interim products (e.g., development of work plans; agreement on a cost-effectiveness screening tool) and final products (e.g., first filing of a DSM plan). Limits also can be set on the amount of time to be spent on the treatment of specific issues (e.g., long-run avoided costs; environmental externalities). These time constraints can be imposed internally, set by PUCs, or both.

Summary

This paper has described DSM collaboratives in terms of four key contextual and organizational characteristics: regulatory and legal history, parties involved and excluded, scope of the collaborative, and the collaborative process itself. Though no two DSM collaboratives have been exactly the same, they share many similarities, which are summarized below.

Collaboratives often are preceded by a history of litigation on DSM and other resource issues, but the ability of such

pressure to result in a utility decision to collaborate frequently is influenced by the utility's own strategic needs. PUC action, the prospect of such action, or the expression of active PUC interest in DSM programs also can influence utilities to participate in a collaborative arrangement. The incentive to collaborate is likely to be greatest where utilities and NUPs each consider the strength of their traditional adversaries to be roughly the same as their own, making it unlikely that they could accomplish their objectives through litigation.

Nonutility participants in collaboratives include consumer and environmental advocates, large industrial electricity users, state energy offices, and state regulatory staff. It was found that the expectations of participants, their commitment of time and resources, and their willingness to negotiate mutually acceptable solutions could strongly affect collaborative outcomes. Limiting the number of collaborative participants could increase the likelihood that a mutually acceptable solution will be reached, but it also raises the possibility that some interests will be overlooked and that intervention will occur.

In nearly all cases, program design and policy issues were addressed as well as monitoring and evaluation strategies. Collaborative participants differed among themselves on whether or not policy issues should be raised early in the process. However, all indications are that the issue of fuel switching proved difficult to resolve wherever it was raised.

Organizationally, most of the collaboratives had a three level structure, although several used a two level arrangement and one collaborative had four levels. It appears that achieving group acceptance of overall goals and participant responsibilities early in the process can help avoid some kinds of future conflict. During the life of the collaborative, active involvement by upper management can prove helpful in resolving contentious issues. Other process-related findings concern the central importance of utility funding of NUP consultants, the value of consensus decision-making in allowing NUPs to exert greater influence on plan contents, the potential importance of outside mediators, and the value of using time constraints to avoid excessive delays in the collaborative process.

We believe that the use of collaboratives will continue to grow. We hope that the information on the collaborative process presented in this paper and in the full report on our study (Raab and Schweitzer 1992) will be helpful to those who engage in collaborative efforts in the future.

Acronyms

CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CG&E	Cincinnati Gas and Electric Company
CL&P	Connecticut Light and Power Company
CLF	Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Inc.
CV	Central Vermont Public Service Corporation
DPUC	Department of Public Utility Control
DSM	Demand-side Management
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NEES	New England Electric System
NUP	Nonutility party
NYSEG	New York State Electric and Gas Corporation
OPC	Office of Peoples' Counsel
PEPCo	Potomac Electric Power Company
PUC	Public Utility Commission
VP	Vice President

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