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Our Perspective on the “Rebound Effect” – Is It True That the More Efficient a Product Becomes, the More Its Owner Will Use It?


January 12, 2011 - 11:52am
By Steven Nadel, Executive Director

Two recent articles have argued that as the energy efficiency of products improve, it becomes less expensive to operate these products and as a result, people increase their use of these products, increasing energy use and potentially wiping out the energy savings caused by the efficiency gains.

In “Solid-State Lighting: An Energy-Economics Perspective,” Tsao and his co-authors look at lighting energy use and efficiency over the past 300 years and conclude that over this period, the world spent about 0.72% of its GDP on light. As lighting has improved in efficiency and as incomes have risen, use of light has increased. The authors then extrapolate these trends into the future to conclude “that there is a massive potential for growth in the consumption of light if new lighting technologies are developed with higher luminous efficacies and lower cost of light.”

Likewise, David Owen, in an article published in The New Yorker entitled “The Efficiency Dilemma,” notes that “[a] growing group of economists and others have argued that [correlations between energy efficiency and energy use] aren’t coincidental… [and that] efforts to improve energy efficiency can more than negate environmental gains…” As support for this idea, he discusses the rising amount of refrigeration and air conditioning since the 1950’s.

Both articles make some useful points. For example, Tsao and his co-authors note that the increases in lighting and lighting efficiency contribute to increased human productivity and quality of life. But both articles tend to conflate correlation with causality and underestimate the impacts of a growing economy on these trends.  

To help illustrate these points, it is useful to differentiate between direct rebound and indirect rebound.

Direct rebound is the impact of a purchase of an efficient product by the purchaser’s use of that product. For example, a car buyer may drive an efficient car more often than an inefficient car. But, as Owen quotes in his article, an engineer from Stanford University argues “that processes, products, and activities where energy is a very high part of the cost — in this country a few metals, a few chemicals, air travel — are the only ones whose variable cost is very sensitive to energy.” Owen goes on to note: “Most economists and experts have come to similar conclusions. For example, some of them say that when you increase the fuel efficiency of cars you lose no more than about ten percent of the fuel savings to increased use.”

Indirect rebound, on the other hand, is the impact of re-spending the money that consumers and businesses save from improved energy efficiency. For example, a household that cuts its heating bill may use a little of the savings on higher thermostat settings, but much of the extra income might be spent on eating out or buying a new flat screen television. These latter items contribute to extra economic growth, but also contribute to increased energy use. ACEEE economist Skip Laitner recently did an illustrative analysis on this and found that energy efficiency policies will increase energy savings, helping to lower energy prices modestly and increase household income. These price and income effects will in turn take back about 25% of the energy saved from the efficiency policies, before accounting for these indirect effects.

Owen’s example of the rising saturation of air conditioning in homes is an example of indirect rebound, but indirect rebound is only part of the story. For example, in the U.S., Owen notes that in 1960 only 12% of American households had air conditioning. Today, that figure is about 84% according to the Energy Information Administration.  Over these 50 years, the efficiency of air conditioners has more than doubled, decreasing energy use per unit of cooling by just over 50%. But the average American home with central air conditioning spends about $300 annually on air conditioning, so even if this is half of what it would have been if we all had air conditioners with 1960 efficiency levels, the $300 per year in energy cost savings is not nearly enough to drive the large increase in use of air conditioners.

Much more likely, the causes of rising use of air conditioners are due to rising household incomes and the declining price of air conditioners. To illustrate, according to government statistics, the average American household made $52,029 in 2008, up substantially from the $6,691 in 1960 ($48,956 in 2008 dollars using the Consumer Price Index, but still more than $3,000 less than 2008 household income). Likewise, the average central air conditioner had an average value (selling price) to the manufacturer of $738 in 2009. Costs to consumers are roughly four times this amount, after including markups from the manufacturer to the customer plus installation, totaling a cost to a homeowner of about $2,952 for a new air conditioner in 2009. Adjusting this 2009 value to manufacturers for changes in the production cost index for air conditioners since 1960, the typical 1960 central air conditioner would have a cost to consumers of about $884 in 1960 dollars and $6,396 in 2009 dollars, In other words, air conditioners now cost less than half what they cost in 1960 in constant dollars.

Similarly, rising incomes and declining costs are driving growing saturations of microwave ovens, personal computers, and flat screen televisions. But for natural gas on the other hand, growing efficiencies are driving absolute declines in consumption since there are not significant new uses of natural gas. In 2005, the average household used 67 thousand cubic feet of natural gas, down from 87.5 in 1993. Since homes are getting larger, the decline in gas use per square foot of floor area is even more dramatic. Owen conspicuously did not mention this major trend. And for residential refrigerators, Owen is overstating the case, since the 75% lower energy use for new refrigerators that he cites is only partially offset with the growing saturation of second refrigerators (e.g., an increase from 14% of households with two or more refrigerators in 1993 to 25% in 2005). But Owen does correctly note that higher energy costs, such as through higher energy taxes, would contribute to reducing energy use.

Returning to Tsao and his co-authors, they do note that much of the increase in lighting efficiency and lighting use has helped to increase economic growth and individual well-being. The same can be said for growing use of air conditioning and household refrigeration, at least to some point. Tsao and his co-authors also note that while lighting energy use in developing countries is likely to continue growing, developed countries may be approaching saturation in the demand for light. We agree with this latter point. For example, with the increasing use of computer screens and increasing concerns about glare, the Illuminating Engineering Society now recommends lighting to 30 footcandles in offices with computer work, down from the 75 footcandles typically recommended for offices in their 1981 Handbook. Similarly, a recent analysis by Schipper and Millard-Ball found that in eight developed countries (including the U.S.), while transportation use per capita grew until about 2000, transportation use per capita since then has stopped growing.

Summing up, the use of lighting, air-conditioning, and personal vehicles has been growing as incomes grow and products come down in cost. Improved energy efficiency has contributed only marginally to the growing use of these services. Energy efficiency has helped to moderate (but not eliminate) the associated increases in energy use as these services grow. But for some energy uses, such as natural gas use for heating homes, improved energy efficiency has resulted in real declines in energy use. Overall, energy efficiency has helped to moderate growth in energy use, with energy use in the U.S. climbing much more slowly than GDP since the 1973 oil crisis. However, eliminating growth in energy use while the economy grows has proven much more challenging.

Comments

This is a reply from a rebound researcher who believes...

This is a reply from a rebound researcher who believes rebound is around 100% and who was interviewed for the New Yorker article criticized in the blog. First, if we are discussing policies for conserving energy, more specifically burning fossil fuels at a slower rate, or tackling the problems of air-borne emissions, we do not need to talk about energy efficiency at all because there are policy options available that are successful by definition: overall caps on consumption of energy, whether through physically-defined rationing or high environmental taxes.

Unfortunately, the 1970s revived an idea that Jevons’ book The Coal Question put into a coma in 1865, namely that input-reduction per unit of output (efficiency) means reduction of total input consumption (conservation). Also unfortunately, refutations by Brookes and Khazzoom around 1980 went unheeded, and we are still taking seriously the idea of cutting consumption by the unnecessary and insufficient indirect means of technological efficiency. Rebound research must thus first compute what savings would have amounted to if, following efficiency increases, consumption of goods and services had not risen – e.g. when cars become 10% more fuel efficient (ton-kilometers per joule) but no new cars are bought but nobody drives farther or faster. This easily computable, happy quantity of joules – known in the jargon as ‘engineering savings’ – then serves as the basis to measure ‘rebound’ input-consumption as a percentage of these purely theoretical ‘savings’. Yes, the rebound discussion is exclusively and thoroughly theoretical and counter-factual.

The only facts we have is that there is a near-perfect correlation, over decades and worldwide, between efficiency ($ per joule) and joules consumed. We also know that the law of the price elasticity of demand – to my knowledge not yet repealed by the economics profession – says that lower inputs must momentarily lower demand, which lowers prices, which attracts marginal consumers raising demand once more, i.e. some rebound is as certain as death and taxes. If we must do these unnecessary calculations, at least we know this, and the question arises as to the burden of proof.

Low-rebound theorists repeatedly ask ‘Where’s the rebound?’ – as if it were empirically measurable, with all its price and substitution elasticities, moreover in a world with growing population and new products. I ask, ‘Where are the savings?’ The empirical correlation alone, to my mind, shifts the burden of proof a long way towards the low-rebounders. At least it is admitted by all that any so-called measurement of rebound depends on a model showing what would have been had the efficiency increases not happened. What, though, is in the models? This brings me to Steve Nadel’s blog: Instead of efficiency increases, which in fact expand what is called the ‘production possibilities frontier’, “rising household incomes” are said to be responsible for increasing consumption of energy inputs. Indeed, in practically all models GDP and rising population are in this way taken exogenously.

But this is begging the question. The high-rebound position, starting with Jevons, replies that rising incomes, GDP and numbers of consumers is, in large part, caused by... efficiency increases (of the organizational or institutional sort as well). It is not legitimate to throw in GDP and population as fully exogenous. Two further objections: First, it is said that “saturation” – which will be a long time coming, worldwide – means we move towards less environmentally-intense purchases. However, a growing literature doubts that there is any variation in joules per dollar spent: methodologies for their computation ignore the fact that labor also entails huge amounts of embodied energy. Second, the concept of an income effect, or what Nadel calls “re-spending”, is not strictly applicable because the money the consumer saves the energy supplier loses, a zero-sum exercise.

Finally, while Nadel’s distinction between “direct” and “indirect” rebound is laudable – many oft-cited, even famous articles get this muddled – his definitions are not correct and complete: “direct” rebound is not “the impact of a purchase of an efficient product by [sic.] the purchaser’s use of that product,” but rather the impact on total purchases of that product by anyone at all. What Nadel describes is closer to the income effect. His definition of “indirect rebound” is acceptable but does not mention ‘marginal consumers’ – those who newly enter the energy market when prices fall a bit – and doesn’t point out that direct + indirect rebound = total rebound and that this is the environmentally relevant quantity and not, for instance, as he later writes, “[consumption] use per capita”. Efficiency increases are great for squeezing more goods and services, or utility, or even happiness, from a joule, or a liter of water, or a plot of soil.

But has higher agricultural efficiency ever meant we take land out of cultivation? Has higher labor efficiency meant that the number of hours worked worldwide has dropped? That is, the case can be made that efficiency increase is neither necessary nor sufficient for lower consumption. This depends on the energy supply curve and the latent demand of a few billion non-saturated consumers.

Thank you, Blake Alcott blakeley@bluewin.ch www.blakealcott.org

ACEEE Response

In his response to my post, Blake Alcott begins his argument by saying: “we do not need to talk about energy efficiency at all because there are policy options available that are successful by definition: overall caps on consumption of energy, whether through physically-defined rationing or high environmental taxes.” Yes, we could take these routes, but they will be very challenging politically, and the costs and dislocations of these policies would likely be higher than if we lead with efficiency. Energy efficiency is our cheapest, cleanest and quickest energy resource.

He also asks: “Where are the savings?” As a recent article by Ron Brownstein in National Journal noted, “The nation’s energy consumption, measured against the size of the economy, has fallen steadily since the first oil embargo in 1973. Today, total energy consumption per dollar of national output—what economists call energy intensity—is less than half of its level.” Brownstein is likely referring to EIA estimates showing that the energy intensity of the U.S. economy energy use per unit of GDP declined 53% since 1973. Alcott’s claim that there is a “near-perfect correlation … between efficiency and joules consumed” is way off base for the U.S. since 1973.

Still, ACEEE is not arguing that there is no rebound, but instead that rebound is moderate and not nearly as extreme as Jevons, Owen, and Alcott profess. To make his case for 100% rebound, Mr. Alcott seems to be talking mostly about economic efficiency and not energy efficiency. He states that “rising incomes, GDP and number of consumers is, in large part caused by efficiency increases.” Yes, increases in economic efficiency can cause these trends. As someone who has devoted his working life to energy efficiency, I wish I could argue that our rising incomes and GDP are due solely to energy efficiency, but there are many other contributors of which energy efficiency is just one.

energy intensity

This is Blake Alcott replying to Steve Nadel above. There is indeed a very good correlation between energy efficiency and energy consumption. That is the rebound issue. Whether energy efficiency (measured as GDP per amount of energy consumed) is rising or not - or the inverse, whether energy intensity is falling or not - is a separate question. Energy intensity can fall and energy consumption can rise over the same time period. In fact that is what happens. Efficiency and intensity are mere ratios; they say nothing about absolute levels of energy consumption, but these are what is relevant for 'the environment' - i.e. depletion and pollution. They only tell us how well we are doing at squeezing affluence out of a given amount of energy. Affluence is simply a different issue.

It's also hard to measure a country's energy consumption and therefore its energy intensity or efficiency: Method 1 (UNFCCC) counts only what's burned in the country. Method 2 counts the net import of embodied energy - the energy it took to make the goods and services consumed in the country in question. This is an ethical/political issue. Usually rich countries are tallied as consuming more if one counts the net imports. Given reliable data, rebound can only be quantified globally; the rebound-consumption due to efficiency increase in country X can happen anywhere in the world.

I'm most certainly not talking about economic efficiency. Only resource efficiency. My point has been that if you are explaining the amount of energy consumed, you can take as causes GDP and population size if you want, but to make this kind of model relevant to the rebound issue you have to include that energy efficiency is one of several factors contributing to GDP and population. Therefore you can only take part of these as contributing exogenously to energy consumption - a large part is behind the scenes attributable to... resource efficiency. That enables more people to live materially better. Organisational efficiency and sheer quantities of resources and people also contribute to GDP and thus to energy consumption, as Steve says. But none of us are disputing this.

Thanks, Blake

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